• Each has input x i
• Want to compute f(x 1 ,…,x n ) for some known function f 
• Each player gets one output: 
Verifiable Secret-Sharing (weaker subtask)
• t ≥ n/4:
n/2 n/3 n/4 n/6 • Look at the state F(|ψ〉) of protocol at the end of sharing phase when all players are honest, and input is |ψ〉
• Protocol is oblivious, so F(|ψ〉)= E|ψ〉 for some trace preserving E.
• At this point, arbitrary corruption of t players can't change reconstructed secret |ψ〉
• Thus E is the encoding operator for a QECC.
Theorem: No VQSS tolerates t ≥ n/4
Proof:
• No cloning says that no QECC can correct n/2 erasures 
Conclusions
• Study general cryptographic tasks in distributed setting
• You can do anything you want when t < n/6
• You can't do much when t ≥ n/4
• Along the way:
-First "zero-knowledge" quantum proofs secure against malicious verifiers -Refined notions of "proximity" to QECC's.
-Wrestled with definitions for malicious quantum adversaries
More Protocol Sketch
How to prove sharing is correct?
• Use Zero-Knowledge Proof techniques due to What does "close to a codeword" mean?
• Shared state should differ from a codeword only on positions held by cheaters
• Natural notion of closeness:
(1) Reduced density matrix of honest players = reduced density matrix of some state in coding space Q • Too strong: Our protocols can't guarantee that.
• Instead:
(2) Shares held by honest players pass parity checks restricted to those positions What does "close to a codeword" mean?
• (1) ≠ (2) - (1) is not even a subspace! -Basic problem: errors and data can be entangled
• Analysis of fault-tolerant protocols only requires (1) • We can only guarantee notion (2)
• Nonetheless, our protocols are secure: -Notion (2) strong enough to ensure well-defined decoding: changes made by cheaters to a state in (2) cannot affect output -Fault-tolerant procedures work for states in (2)
